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Abstract 
This paper attempts to explain why Heidegger‟s thought has evoked both 
positive and negative reactions of such an extreme nature by focussing on 
his answer to the central methodological question “What is Philosophy?” 
After briefly setting forth Heidegger‟s answer in terms of attunement to 
Being, the centrality to it of his view of language and by focussing on his 
relationship with the word „philosophy‟ and with the history of philosophy, 
the author shows how it has led Heidegger to construct his own work, itself 
linguistic, as a self-referential union of form and meaning. It is suggested 
that, from a Heideggerian perspective, this gives his work added 
argumentative force but, conversely, allows the critic no point of entry into 
his hermeneutical circle – hence the extreme reactions. This observation is 
then applied to address a related critical question; it is used to make sense of 
the apparent distinction, in Heidegger‟s work, between talking about 
attunement to Being and actually effecting such an attunement. The author 
argues that, for Heidegger, there is actually no distinction and that his 
apparent descriptions of attunement to Being at once describe and effect 
such an attunement. This union can therefore be conceived as one dimension 
of the intimacy, previously observed, between form and content and which is 
recognised to be a feature of Heidegger‟s work by both the acolyte and the 
critic. 
 
I 
 
My purpose in this paper is to consider the nature of Heidegger‟s 
later thought, more specifically, the thought expressed in his work 
written in the 1940s and ‟50s. It is not to defend Heidegger‟s views but 
rather to explain why his work has evoked the extreme reactions recorded 
by Steiner, who observes that Heidegger is seen as: 
 
a prolix charlatan and poisoner of good sense or, on the contrary, a 
master of insight, a philosopher-teacher whose works may renew the 
inward condition of man…Let me repeat: there seems to be no other 
example of so absolute a difference of judgment in the whole range of 
the history of Western thought since Socrates (1992, p. 6). 
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I think that part of the reason is the way in which Heidegger responds to 
a methodological question, namely, the way in which he conceives the 
very nature of philosophy, a conception closely related to his views on 
language. I begin by outlining Heidegger‟s view of this relation drawing 
mainly on a lecture delivered in 1955 whose English title (we shall return 
to this point) takes the form of the central philosophical methodological 
question, “What is Philosophy?” 
 Cardinal, here, is Heidegger‟s notion of the „ontological difference‟ 
which the lecture‟s translators render as the distinction between „Being‟ 
and „being‟. Unlike Julian Young (2002, pp. 10ff.), who uses the same 
typographical device to distinguish between senses of „Sein‟ (or, in some 
cases, between „Sein‟ and „Seyn‟), the translators of this lecture have in 
mind the distinction between „Seiendes‟ and „Sein‟ – between what is 
(perhaps, even, the sum total of what exists) and the mystery, „It‟, which 
„gives‟ what is, the condition for there being anything (Young 2002, p. 
17).
1
 Since Plato and Aristotle, according to Heidegger (1958, p. 53), 
philosophy has concerned itself with the question „What is being [das 
Seiende]?‟, a question which is „en route‟ to what Heidegger (1958, pp. 
54-5) regards to be the real business of philosophical enquiry, the Being 
of being, being with respect to Being. Following the reading of 
Heidegger provided by Young (2002) and Cooper (2005) we may 
express the business of philosophy, just described, as a way of regarding 
beings [Seiendes] as an epiphany of or gift from Being [Sein], mystery.  
Heidegger‟s (1958, p. 69) term for the way in which philosophers 
should concern themselves with this business is „co-respondence‟ [Ent-
sprechung]. The answer to our methodological question is a 
correspondence that responds to the Being of being. Steiner‟s gloss on 
this term is helpful: “a response, a vital echo, a „re-sponsion‟ in the 
liturgical sense of a participatory engagement” (1992, p. 29). What 
underwrites the term „correspondence‟ is what Steiner calls an 
„answerability‟ to the question of Being, a dimension of transformative 
personal involvement,
2
 of receptivity to Being, which Heidegger believes 
to have been systematically excised from Western philosophy after 
                                                 
1 I follow their convention in this essay and use the words „being‟ and „beings‟ 
interchangeably to refer to Heidegger‟s „Seiendes‟ and „Being‟ to refer to his „Sein‟ (or 
„Seyn‟). 
2 “The path of our discussion must, therefore, be of such a kind and direction that that of 
which philosophy treats concerns us personally, affects us and indeed, touches us in our 
very nature” (Heidegger 1958, p. 23). 
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Socrates and which I now outline. For Heidegger (1978, p. 240), owing 
to the mystery and ineffability of Being, Being must be “thought on the 
basis of beings” which can only be „lit up‟ for humanity via our 
meaningful structures of being-in-the-world. Thus philosophy is about 
cultivating a certain kind of comportment towards Being via beings and 
towards beings with respect to Being. It is about attuning oneself to an 
experience of beings as a mysterious „gift from‟ or „epiphany of‟ Being 
(Cooper 2005, p. 136). It is about attuning ourselves to an experience of 
the „world‟ itself (with which, in our being-in-the-world, we are 
interdependent) as mysterious. I now examine the way in which 
Heidegger believes that this attunement is effected in philosophy through 
language. 
It is especially in and through language that we become attuned to 
Being in the experience of „correspondence‟ which, in Heidegger‟s view, 
it is the business of philosophy to effect.
3
 The very word „ent-sprechen‟ 
includes the word „sprechen‟ („speaking‟) and this signifies for 
Heidegger that philosophy as „correspondence‟ is “in the service of 
language” (1958, p. 93).4 This subversion of the common view of the 
relationship between philosophy and language is a variation on his well-
known claim that „language speaks‟. This claim can be interpreted in the 
terms of Heidegger‟s discussion of the nature of language, a discussion 
whose subject-matter is, he tells us, “the possibility of undergoing an 
experience with language”; these last words, he insists, were carefully 
chosen to highlight the fact that “we mean, specifically, that the 
experience is not of our own making” (1971, p. 57). 
As Heidegger suggests, speaking is, „in advance‟, a hearing; we are 
only able to speak because “we have already listened to language. What 
do we hear there? We hear language speaking” (1978a, p. 411).5 The 
source of the „saying‟ to which Heidegger exhorts us to listen is Being. 
But Being is not distinct from this „saying‟ – it would be more accurate, 
Cooper suggests, to say that Being “is a „Saying‟” (1996, p. 84).6 As 
Heidegger puts it, “We are trying to listen to the voice of Being” (1958, 
p. 89), where the word „of‟ is used with care owing to the intimacy of 
                                                 
3 Language, in other words, is the medium of philosophy. Heidegger explicitly makes the 
connexion between correspondence and attunement; he writes: “[c]orrespondence…is in an 
attunement” (1958, p. 77). 
4 We shall return to the justifiability of the etymological mode of argument in play here. 
5 My emphasis. 
6 Emphasis in original. 
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language and Being which Cooper highlights: language is, Heidegger 
tells us, the “language of Being” as clouds are the “clouds of the sky” 
(1978, p. 265). 
The point here, as Cooper (1996, pp. 84ff) points out, is an intimate 
connexion between the interdependence of words and speech on the one 
hand and that of reality and its source on the other. The way in which 
beings (on the basis of which, recall, Being must be thought) are lit up 
for us is, for Heidegger, essentially linguistic (this is what Steiner calls 
the “language-condition” (1992, p. 7) of human existence), but words 
designating beings are not just arbitrary signs imposed upon the world. 
Rather they are inseparable from, interdependent with, the „saying‟ 
whose source is Being, or, better, which is Being. Thus the integration of 
beings into our linguistic understanding is primarily receptive, “not 
wholly our product” (Cooper 1996, p. 86); it consists, for Heidegger, in a 
receptive listening to the voice of Being. 
This „saying‟ then „arrives at‟ human speech or „language‟ (the 
media of philosophy and poetry) which, insofar as it is attentive to the 
„saying‟ of Being upon which it is dependent, must be conceived as its 
„reiteration‟ (Heidegger 1978a, pp. 418, 423). Philosophy as 
correspondence is just such a „reiteration‟; it is, to mirror Gabriel 
Marcel‟s phrase,7 „receptive creativity‟. On the one hand, attunement to 
Being is not, as we have just seen, „caused‟ by human speech but is 
rather “handed over...from Being” (Heidegger 1978, p. 217). On the 
other, however, the philosopher and the poet can, indeed must, bring the 
manifestation of Being to language and maintain it in language through 
their speech (Heidegger 1978, p. 217). To put it another way (for 
propositions will never be wholly adequate here) “language…is 
appropriated by Being and pervaded by Being (Heidegger 1978, p. 237). 
To quote Heidegger once again: “Language is the house of Being. In its 
home man dwells” (1978, p. 217). 
Steiner glosses this statement in a way that highlights the strictly 
inseparable creative and receptive dimensions to the philosopher‟s task. 
He expresses the receptive dimension to the philosopher‟s task by saying 
that “it is not man who determines Being, but Being that via language 
discloses itself to and in man” (Steiner 1992, p. 128). But there is a kind 
                                                 
7
 Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) is a neglected French philosopher, playwright and musician 
whose thought is difficult to categorise, though he is sometimes called (against his own 
wishes) a „religious existentialist‟. He was a contemporary of Heidegger‟s and met him in 
Fribourg in 1946. 
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of creative obligation entailed by the acceptance of this. It is man‟s duty 
as the language-animal to „shelter‟ the truth of Being in language by 
reiteration; his duty is one of “custodianship, answerability to and for” 
Being (Steiner 1992, p. 32). “It is as if, when speaking, we are 
hearkening to and translating signs which have been given us” (Cooper 
1996, p. 86).
8
 It is this inseparability of creative and receptive dimensions 
that, I think, Heidegger is getting at when he famously states that man is 
the “shepherd of Being” (1978, p. 234). 
Since language is philosophy‟s medium all of this has major 
implications for the actual practice of philosophy. Unsurprisingly, these 
implications may most clearly be seen to be at work in Heidegger‟s 
relationship with the very word „philosophy‟. It is Heidegger‟s belief that 
Western philosophy after Socrates has, for the most part, been inattentive 
to the voice of Being owing to both an inadequate instrumentalist 
conception of the language in which it is couched as an objectifying 
instrument of dominion over beings and a forgetfulness of the receptive 
dimension to authentic speaking to which, we have seen, Heidegger is 
trying to draw our attention afresh. 
At times Heidegger (1978, p. 265) sets up „philosophy‟ and 
„thinking‟ as almost opposites and seems to regard the former to be so 
enmeshed with a faulty view of language as to be unsalvageable. Thus he 
often seems to prefer the word „thinking‟ as a description of his own 
project. It seems legitimate to ask, on his own terms, whether it wouldn‟t 
be simplest for Heidegger just to abandon „philosophy‟ altogether, since 
the tension between Heidegger and his „philosophical‟ critics is such that 
each believes the (at best misguided and at worst downright pernicious) 
views of the other to be a function of a misguided relationship with 
language.
9
 
However Heidegger‟s relationship with „philosophy‟ is ambiguous. 
He does think that the history of philosophy, correctly viewed, can 
transmit the voice of Being. Being can appropriate even the language of 
the „metaphysicians‟ to make its „saying‟ heard – we only need to read it 
correctly, that is, with receptivity to Being‟s voice. With characteristic 
insistence on the union or non-differentiation between passive and active, 
receptive and creative,
10
 Heidegger tells us that we must be “in 
                                                 
8 Emphasis in original. 
9 See Carnap (1978) for the kind of critique I have in mind throughout this paper. 
10 This is expressed, elsewhere, as “beyond the distinction between activity and passivity” 
(Heidegger 1966, p. 61). 
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conversation with” [im Gespräch mit] (1958, p. 71) the history of 
„philosophy‟ in order to attain correspondence through it. This attainment 
depends both on Being deigning to „speak‟ through the philosophical 
tradition and our reading of that tradition in the correct way. If this is 
right, there are, for Steiner (1992, pp. 29-30) at least, important 
implications for academic practice if philosophy or thinking is to remain 
an academic enterprise. Owing to the „thoughtless‟ or „unthinking‟ 
tendencies evident in the history of philosophy, the academic‟s business 
should not be primarily to transmit summaries of, or even to 
„understand‟, the writings of the philosophers of the past but rather to 
appropriate the historical tradition of philosophy as something in and 
through which the voice of Being can be heard. 
 Thus, for Heidegger, the advantages of maintaining some 
relationship to „philosophy‟ can outweigh the disadvantages. Although 
the history of philosophy has been made subject to systematic 
misinterpretation it could perhaps become a powerful way in which man 
can attain correspondence, attunement to Being.
11
 Heidegger writes: 
 
Should we not rather suffer a little while longer those inevitable 
misinterpretations to which the path of thinking in the element of Being 
and time has hitherto been exposed and let them slowly dissipate? 
(1978, p. 248) 
 
It is this optimism, I think, which, despite his pejorative use of the word 
„philosophy‟ by the 1940s,12 led Heidegger to retain the word in (and 
even in the title of) his lecture of 1955. But we can discern even here in 
the title the gentle, persuasive attempt to hasten the dissipation of 
misinterpretations and the necessarily ambivalent relation to „philosophy‟ 
which it implies and to which Heidegger has, at least at this stage of his 
life, resigned himself. Steiner describes the „subtle twofold effect‟, lost in 
translation, of the German title of the lecture, Was ist das – die 
Philosophie?: 
 
by setting off die Philosophie, by compelling a hiatus and pause 
between the most general form of ontological query (namely, “What is 
                                                 
11 It is worth noting that Heidegger‟s openness to „philosophy‟ is not reciprocated by the 
kind of critic I have in mind who does not think that Heidegger, correctly viewed, can make 
a significant contribution to „philosophy‟. 
12 See Heidegger 1978; Cooper 1996, p. 86. 
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this or that or anything?”) and the object actually in view, Heidegger … 
makes the notion “philosophy”, of which we might have claimed an 
everyday, confident control, somewhat strange and distant; and he 
makes it dependent on, ancillary to, the greater, more pressing question 
and notion of “isness” and “whatness.” (1992, p. 20) 
 
Owing to the inevitably linguistic nature of Heidegger‟s work (which it 
shares with „philosophy‟), it is only by explicitly and self-referentially 
drawing our attention to the ambiguous relationship to the word 
„philosophy‟ that Heidegger can avoid his own work from being 
misinterpreted as just another contribution to the history of philosophy, 
which amounts, for him, to the history of „metaphysics‟.13 It is only once 
this pitfall has been avoided, and Heidegger‟s cue has thus been given, 
that the misinterpretations of the history of „metaphysics‟ can be allowed 
to slowly „dissipate‟ and be replaced, as the historical philosophical 
tradition is re-appropriated by an attentiveness to the voice of Being. It 
should by now be clear that the way in which Heidegger avoids this 
pitfall is by making the linguistic medium of his work essential to the 
message in a tightly-woven, self-referential union. 
It follows that whether Heidegger succeeds or fails in attuning us to 
Being (or even in convincing us that „attunement to Being‟ is a 
meaningful notion) after what he regards to be the systematic „forgetting‟ 
that has characterised the history of the West, will depend to a large 
extent upon whether he is able to convince us of his view of the nature of 
language. As Steiner expresses this entrenchment in language of the 
„question of Being‟ and thus the „forgetting of Being‟: 
 
If the “question of being,” the Seinsfrage, strikes us as vacuous, or as a 
mystical word-game, or as purely and simply nonsense…the reason is, 
literally, linguistic (1992, p. 45). 
 
This will not suffice to convince those philosophers who, as Steiner 
(1992, p. 6) notes, regard Heidegger to be a „prolix charlatan‟ who is 
simply and literally talking nonsense. As the previous quotation 
intimates, the view of Heidegger as one who is making a worthwhile 
contribution to thought (let alone, with Steiner, as one who is a „master 
of insight‟) stands or falls with one‟s view of language and its relation to 
                                                 
13 „Metaphysics‟ is pejoratively understood as ontical as opposed to ontological enquiry, the 
immersion in beings at the expense of Being and their almost systematic confusion. 
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philosophy. It does not help that Heidegger‟s argument concerning this 
very relation itself makes use of language in the very way that critics find 
suspect. For example, both the Greek connexions of the word 
philosophia and the definition of philosophy as ent-sprechung which is in 
the service of sprechung in Heidegger‟s lecture depend on what Steiner 
calls “the most characteristic and disputed move in Heidegger‟s thought: 
the argument from and through etymology” (1992, pp. 21-2). 
These arguments will not be persuasive for critics who deny that 
philosophy is in the service of language in the way that Heidegger 
claims. Further, this opinion, that the Seinsfrage is vacuous nonsense, is, 
as we have seen, based upon a view of language that has dominated, or at 
least been present in, „philosophy‟ for most of its history. From 
Heidegger‟s converse perspective, and from that of those who do have 
time for his distinctive views on language, this is a function of 
„philosophy‟s‟ faulty instrumentalist view of language which has placed 
language itself “under the dictatorship of the public realm, which decides 
in advance what is intelligible and what must be rejected as 
unintelligible” (1978, p. 221). Whilst I do not see any easy way of 
refuting one or other of these positions, it is clear that the reason for the 
tension between them is Heidegger‟s tactical incorporation of his beliefs 
on language into his very way of philosophising.  
It is in this way that Heidegger‟s caution against the possibility of 
misinterpretation, which manifests itself as this incorporation, comes at a 
potential cost. If what he says about language, and thus the attunement to 
Being which I have argued that it amounts to, is well taken, Heidegger‟s 
argument will be all the more powerful since his claims are reinforced in 
more than one way, by the forms in which they are made. But for the 
very same reasons, a reader who is not convinced by Heidegger‟s view of 
language will find no „way in‟ to his way of thinking, no point of entry 
into the hermeneutical circle. This reader will deny that Heidegger is 
doing „philosophy‟ and, whatever he chooses to call it, he is, in any case, 
talking through his hat. But either way, it would be difficult to disagree 
with the comment made by Steiner which highlights the centrality of 
language, especially Heidegger‟s own, to his thought: “no aspect of 
Heideggerian thought can be divorced from the phenomenon of 
Heidegger‟s prose style” (1992, p. 9). It is for this reason, I think, that 
Heidegger‟s work has evoked the extreme reactions recorded by Steiner 
and noted at the outset.  
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II 
 
I now want to address a critical question arising from the intimacy, 
just observed, between meaning and form in Heidegger‟s work. In the 
work I have been considering he seems to be trying to do two things. 
Firstly, as a philosopher himself, he is trying, via language, to attune his 
readers to, to bring about correspondence with, the mystery of Being as 
manifested in (or as) beings. But also, secondly, and which is surely a 
precondition, he is trying to change our relation to language, to move us 
away from the instrumentalist view according to which it is an 
“instrument of dominion over beings” and towards a view of language, 
insofar as it makes possible the meaningful experience of beings (as 
which Being epiphanizes, on the basis of which it must be thought), as 
the “advent of Being itself” (Heidegger 1978a, p. 425; 1978, p. 230) and 
towards an awareness of this view‟s receptive-creative implications for 
the conduct (irrespective of the name we use) of the „thinker‟ or 
„philosopher‟. In other words, there would appear to be a distinction, 
even a tension, in Heidegger‟s work between his talking about the way in 
which the philosopher can and should attune his readers to the mystery of 
Being via language and his actually so attuning them (and the former, 
further, appears to be a prerequisite for the latter). How do we make 
sense of this apparent distinction? Are we to believe that in all those 
essays in which Heidegger outlines the roles of the thinker and the poet 
and discusses the way in which attunement to Being may be effected (a 
large portion of his work), he is doing nothing to give us a sense of 
Being? If he is writing for people who are already attuned to Being, then 
they are in no need of his writings and if he is writing for those who are 
not, why doesn‟t he get cracking straight away and attune them? As he 
himself writes: “everything first depends upon attaining a 
correspondence before we set up a theory about it” (Heidegger 1958, p. 
69). 
 It is my suggestion that there is actually no distinction, that talking 
about attunement to Being (via language or otherwise) is actually 
partially constitutive of such an attunement. I want to argue that this is a 
specific dimension of the union of form and content that we have 
observed in Heidegger‟s work and which, I have been arguing, evokes 
equally vigorous responses from the acolyte and the critic. In this way, 
the observation of the union of form and content can be applied to and 
used to make sense of, a critical question arising from the apparent 
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tension in Heidegger‟s thought between what might be called first and 
second-order claims. This being the case we are quite at liberty to accept 
or reject Heidegger‟s views but the claim, on his own terms, that 
Heidegger is „all mouth‟ cannot successfully be used against him by his 
critics. 
The fact that we are unable to step outside language might lead us 
to think that the possibility of „undergoing an experience with language‟ 
is itself brought to language every time we speak. In most cases, 
however, as Heidegger says, “language never has the floor” (1971, p. 
59); instead, whatever we are speaking about occludes the experience of 
language itself as, for Heidegger, the „house of Being‟. In this way, 
insofar as Heidegger‟s remarks on language are linguistically expressed, 
his own remarks will, if he is right on this, consist in „reiteration‟ of the 
voice of Being, the establishment of attunement and correspondence. 
Owing both to this fact and to the mystery of Being, some of Heidegger‟s 
uses of language are not, and cannot be, in the mode of „assertion‟ or 
„representation‟ (1978a, p. 424). 
When the „scientist‟ in Heidegger‟s Conversation (1966, p. 67) 
claims not to have understood the previous remarks about thinking, the 
„teacher‟ (Heidegger‟s persona?) replies “I don‟t understand it either, if 
by understanding you mean the capacity to re-present what is put before 
us”. In this sense, as Clark claims, some of Heidegger‟s work “cannot be 
read as being „about‟ something in the familiar sense of making a 
conceptual model of it. They strive towards the status of thinking-in-
action” (2002, p. 88). Thus Heidegger‟s writings, apparently „about‟ 
language, have the ulterior motive of attuning us to Being. We are now, I 
think, in a position to understand the comment Heidegger makes at the 
very beginning of his lecture that the question “Was ist das – die 
Philosophie?” leads us “into a path” (1958, p. 21).14 Heidegger‟s 
Conversation is, as the title testifies, „about thinking‟ but all the while the 
participants are walking along a country path. The translators make a 
suggestion as to the significance of this fact as follows: 
 
We might think of it, metaphorically, as the activity of walking along a 
path which leads to Being. Certainly metaphorically, the conversation 
                                                 
14 Steiner (1992, p. 18) points out that peregrination is a favourite theme of Heidegger‟s. 
Many of his titles revolve around this theme: Holzwege [Off The Beaten Track], 
Wegmarken [Pathmarks], Unterwegs zur Sprache [On the Way to Language], Der Feldweg 
[The Field-Path] and so on. 
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along the path referred to in the Conversation symbolizes such an 
activity and in such a direction (Heidegger 1966, p. 22). 
 
We get the impression that the teacher and scholar are trying to teach the 
scientist, who is more tied to „representational thought‟, to employ the 
rhetoric of thinking, of attunement to Being. When he believes that he 
has finally been able to do this he claims, significantly, that what allowed 
him to do so was “more the course of the conversation than the re-
presentation of the specific objects we spoke about” (Heidegger 1966, p. 
69). The perhaps inadequate Greek word that they agree upon to 
designate the, strictly ineffable, nature of thinking refers to the walk 
along the country path itself: “it is never the goal which counts, but only 
the journey” (Heidegger 1966, p. 89; Steiner 1992, p. 18). 
In this way, though it cannot decide the issue, the observation that 
Heidegger incorporates his views on language into his very way of 
philosophising (or thinking), in a union of form and meaning, is of great 
importance. It is especially relevant to the crucial question of whether we 
regard Heidegger to be talking nonsense or providing a much-needed 
radical and transformative way of getting some grasp on the world, on 
ourselves and on that to which, if anything, we are ultimately 
answerable; whether Heidegger gives us a way which transcends the 
rules of „logic‟ and „good sense‟ and is answerable, instead, to the „law 
of Being‟. Further, if accurately made, the observation can also make 
sense of the apparent tension between Heidegger‟s insistence on 
attunement to Being as the task of philosophy or thinking and the fact 
that he spends most of his time apparently talking about such an 
attunement. The non-differentiation of these can thus be understood to be 
a mode of the union between Heidegger‟s form and meaning which, we 
have seen, is responsible for the equally extreme (and, I still think, 
equally irrefutable) positive and negative reactions to his thought.  
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